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ARGUMENT 
L THE PURPOSE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL iMMU N1 r V \ ( '< I ^ 
BROAD AND INCLUDES MANY COMPONENTS. 
I he State claims that the purpose of the Immunity Act ("the Act") is "twofold: 
(i) to provide the State \\ iih an opportunity to eonect the condition that caused the 
injury, and (ii) to evaluate and possibly settle the claim without litigation State's 
Hi I"" i 1 lie purpose cited by the State is too narrow. It is too narrow and it 
ignores the many other purposes behind the Immunity A. Ydmittedly, the 
purposes the State has cited are relevant, however tho\ :n i i : ^ ; n
 : 
the more broad and appropriate purpose recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In Wills v Hshrr Vnllrv Hist RR Auth., 2m„h\ 1111 4: \ '"> P.3d 934, the 
Supreme Court stated the "primary piupoiv of the intuv n| elaiin u\|uirenienl is 
to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and 
tiinolv investigation of the merits of the claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, 
if appropriate, thereby avoiding tlv ^ - . \np - • . -u^ ;v,bl, and 
unnecessary litigation." Wills at ^ [6 (citing Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 
480, IN2 11 lah I M80)) The issue in the Wills case was whether delivering the 
notice of claim to the Attorney General at an acithes. where he holds himself out 
to be, but does not physically work, strictly complied with the Act, when the Act 
was ambigui »os regarding what was required. In Wills, the State claimed that the 
purpose of the Act was to "maximize efficiency of chum processing by limiting 
the delivery of notices to one location," and such efficiency "can - ^ Jv 
1 
by interpreting the Act to mandate that a notice of claim be directed and delivered 
to the attorney general himself at the location in which he keeps a desk and chair." 
Id. at f 5. The Supreme Court in Wills held that this purpose is too narrow and the 
view of directing and delivering to be too restrictive. Id. 
Like the Wills case, this case is similar because the section of Act is void of 
guidance, it has not been interpreted by any Utah Appeals Court, and the State has 
claimed the purpose is narrow. In this case, the "twofold'" purpose the State has 
cited is too narrow because it ignores the other important purposes which are part 
of the Act. For example, in Wills, the Supreme Court recognized that "[ejfficient 
claim processing is a component" of the more general pmpose of the statute. Id. at 
%6. As in Wills, the purpose cited by the State in this case is certainly a 
"component" of the more general purpose. However, this Court should look to the 
more general purpose of the statute that includes many important components. By 
recognizing a general purpose like the Wills court did, all components like 
investigation of the location, ascertainment of the cause, correcting the dangerous 
condition, efficient claims processing, evaluation of the claim, settlement of the 
claim, etc., will get the attention they deserve. 
Holding that the purpose of the Act is more general, i.e. to allow the State to 
conduct an investigation, evaluate and possibly settle the claim, Plaintiffs and the 
State will benefit. The State will benefit because they will be required to conduct 
a thorough investigation which will allow them to address all relevant components 
in an accurate and responsible manner. Plaintiffs will benefit because, after the 
2 
State has conducted a thorough and complete investigation, the State will be in a 
better position to settle a meritorious claim. Therefore, by recognizing that the 
purpose is general or broad in nature, all responsibilities of the State and Plaintiffs 
will be considered and dealt with in a fair and proper manner. 
II. CASES CITED BY THE STATE ARE DISTINGUISHABLE. 
The State relies on two cases in their brief to stand for the proposition that 
Utah courts have addressed the "content" of the claim. State's Br. P. 11. The two 
cases are Years ley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) and Straley v. Halliday, 
997 P.2d 338 (Utah App. 2000). The two cases are distinguishable because both 
involve a different section of the statute. The issue in Years ley and Straley was 
whether the plaintiffs notice gave a sufficient statement of the "nature of the 
claim." Moreover, the cases are also distinguishable because the section in the 
Act regarding the "nature of the claim" is better defined than the section in this 
case1. In this case, the issue is whether Ms. Peeples gave a sufficient "brief 
statement of facts." Under the Immunity act a plaintiff is required to include "(i) a 
brief statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the 
damages incurred by the claimant so far a they are known." Utah Code Annotated 
§ 63-30-11 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
1
 As used in this chapter: (1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for 
money or damages against a governmental entity or against an employee." Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-2(1997). 
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In Yearsley, the court looked to whether the plaintiff could maintain an action 
for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution when the notice of claim only 
complained of assault and battery. Yearsley at 1127. In Straley, the plaintiffs 
claim was dismissed where the notice of claim failed to allege conduct that 
amounted to a violation of the law. Straley at 342. Specifically, in Straley the 
plaintiff only alleged in their notice that Judge Halliday acted "wrongfully and 
willfully" and did not allege that he acted with "malice" or committed a "fraud" 
which are required to preserve a claim against a governmental employee. Id. In 
both Yearsley and Straley, the issue was whether the plaintiff included a proper 
statement regarding the "nature of the claim," which is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-2. See, footnote 1. 
Here, Yearsley is distinguishable and not relevant because the case involved 
distinct causes of action. For example, an assault or battery is fundamentally 
different than malicious prosecution or unlawful arrest. Each crime or claim 
involves different facts that need to be proven at trial and in the case of malicious 
prosecution versus assault or battery, the facts are completely different in both 
time and injury. Also, the statute defines what a "claim" is for the purposes of a 
notice of claim. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 and footnote 1. 
Also, Straley is distinguishable because it again falls under the same section of 
the Act which requires a plaintiff to give the "nature of the claim." In the Straley 
case, the plaintiff simply failed to allege facts that constitute a claim against a 
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governmental employee. As the State put it, the plaintiff failed to "utter[] the 
magic words 'fraud or malice.'" State's Br. P. 12. 
In this case, Plaintiff did allege the proper legal claim and further claims that 
she submitted a proper "brief statement of facts." Unlike the facts of Yearsley or 
Straley the issue of what constitutes a proper statement of facts is not clear. The 
Act is completely void of any guidance regarding what is a proper "brief statement 
of facts." There is no definition in the statute like there was in Yearsley and 
Straley. The courts have never defined what constitutes a "brief statement of 
facts." Finally, to impose a standard that requires plaintiff to include material 
facts or "magic words" would impose a burden on the Plaintiff that is not required 
by the Act. 
III. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED TO 
DETERMINE IF PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE WAS CONGRUENT WITH 
THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT. 
Extrinsic evidence needs to be considered to determine if Plaintiff s notice of 
claim was congruent with the purpose of the Act. In the State's brief, the State has 
argued that actual notice is irrelevant. State's Br. P. 15. This argument is 
misplaced because it ignores the issue that was raised by Plaintiff. What the State 
has ignored is that Plaintiff not asking this Court to substitute actual notice for a 
deficiency in the notice of claim. Plaintiff is asking this Court to consider is the 
extrinsic evidence to determine if it provided sufficient information to allow the 
State to conduct an investigation, which would include remedying the problem, 
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ascertaining the amount of Plaintiff s damages, the exact location of the accident, 
the cause of the accident, the date and time of the accident, Plaintiffs injuries, 
witnesses who may of observed the accident, and other relevant components. 
The reason why the extrinsic evidence needs to be considered is because it is 
impossible to determine if the notice was congruent with the purpose without 
considering what the State did with the information once the notice was received. 
For example, if the trial court needed to determine if the State was able to conduct 
an adequate investigation, we must address the investigation and decide if the 
notice had enough information to allow the State to accomplish their objectives. If 
the trial court needed to determine if the notice of claim provided enough 
information to allow the State to remedy the problem, we need to consider if, 
based on the notice, the problem was fixed. If the trial court needed to determine 
where the accident was located, we need to consider if, based on the notice, the 
State was able to discover the location of the accident. 
In sum, if a court has to determine if the notice was congruent with the purpose 
of the Act and the purpose of the Act is to afford the State a proper and timely 
investigation, we must consider the adequacy or inadequacies of the investigation. 
In this case, the trial court refused to consider any such extrinsic evidence. R. 80, 
l|{6. Therefore, to adequately determine if Plaintiff s notice was congruent with the 
purpose of the Act, assuming that this court holds that the notice is not 
independently sufficient, this Court should remand this case to the trial court to 
determine if the investigation was successful based on the notice. 
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IV. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUE ON APPEAL THAT 
WAS NOT RAISED BELOW. 
The State alleges that Plaintiff raised a new "issue" on appeal. State's Br. P. 
17. The State's argument is incorrect. In Plaintiffs appeal brief, Plaintiff urged 
this Court to look to Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (2000) for guidance when 
interpreting the Immunity Act. Plaintiff did not cite this statute below and by 
citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2, the State believes that this is a "new issue" that 
should not be addressed because it was not raised below. Although the statute was 
not raised below, it is not a new issue because it is merely legal support for 
Plaintiffs argument. Specifically, § 68-3-2 falls under Title 68 (Statutes), Chapter 
3 (Construction), and this section of the code is relevant to the interpretation of the 
statutes of Utah. Here, Plaintiff has only cited § 68-3-2 in support of her argument 
that ambiguous statutes, like the statute in this case, should be "liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice." Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-2. 
In the alternative, the State has argued, if this Court addresses 68-3-2 on its 
merits, the Immunity Act "overcomes any law relating to general statutory 
construction," and Plaintiff is using 68-3-2 to overrule the "express mandate and 
language of the Immunity Act." State's Br. P. 18. The State is both correct and 
incorrect in this assertion. The State is correct to the extent that the Immunity 
Act's requirements and standards are not abrogated by 68-3-2. However, the State 
is incorrect to the extent the State believes Plaintiff is using 68-3-2 to "overrule the 
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strict compliance principle" found in the Immunity Act. This distinction needs to 
be addressed. 
The generally cited requirement under the Act is strict compliance, however, 
when there is ambiguity in the Act, both the Supreme Court and this Court have 
looked to the purpose of the Act to detemiine if the Plaintiffs notice of claim was 
congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. See, Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT 
App 247, f25, 53 P.3d 2 and Wills v. Heber Valley Historic Railroad Auth., 2003 
UT 45, f6. Because the Act in this case is completely void of guidance regarding 
what facts to include, Plaintiff has cited and this Court should find § 68-3-2 to 
stand for the proposition that when there is ambiguity in the statute, statutes should 
be "liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. By viewing Plaintiffs notice fairly, 
in light of the ambiguity in the Act, Plaintiff is only asking this Court to use its 
discretion and to follow the laws of this State as interpreted by the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Plaintiff is respectfully asks this Court to hold that Plaintiffs notice 
was sufficient to constitute strict compliance under the Act because she included a 
"brief statement of the facts" that was congruent with the purpose and objective of 
the Act. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision and 
remand the case to consider extrinsic evidence and determine if Plaintiff s notice 
of claim sufficiently provided the State enough information to pursue a proper and 
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timely investigation of the merits of the claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, 
if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly and 
unnecessary litigation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of April, 2004. 
Siegfried & Jensen 
Brock A. Van de Kamp 
Dustin Lance 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/ Appellant 
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